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Abstract
We propose a formalization of the three-tier causal hi-
erarchy of association, intervention, and counterfac-
tuals as a series of probabilistic logical languages.
Our languages are of strictly increasing expressivity,
the first capable of expressing quantitative probabilis-
tic reasoning—including conditional independence and
Bayesian inference—the second encoding do-calculus
reasoning for causal effects, and the third capturing
a fully expressive do-calculus for arbitrary counterfac-
tual queries. We give a corresponding series of finitary
axiomatizations complete over both structural causal
models and probabilistic programs, and show that sat-
isfiability and validity for each language are decidable
in polynomial space.
Introduction and Summary
Intelligence commonly involves prediction, anticipating
future events on the basis of past observations (e.g.,
“Will the water pipes freeze again this winter?”). Intelli-
gent planning and decision-making additionally require
predicting what would happen under a hypothetical ac-
tion (“Will the pipes freeze if we keep the heat on?”). An
even more sophisticated ability—critical for tasks like
explanation—is to reason counterfactually about what
would have happened given knowledge about what in
fact happened (“Would the pipes have frozen if we had
left the heat on, given that the heat was off and the
pipes in fact froze?”). These three modes of reasoning
constitute a causal hierarchy (Shpitser and Pearl 2008;
Pearl 2009), highlighting the significance of structural
causal knowledge for flexible thought and action.
The aim of the present article is to gain conceptual
as well as technical insight into this hierarchy by em-
ploying tools from logic. Loosely following earlier work
(Shpitser and Pearl 2008), we propose a characteriza-
tion of its levels in terms of logical syntax. Semantically,
all three languages are interpreted over the same class
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of models, namely structural causal models (and later
probabilistic programs). The languages differ in how
much they can express about these models. L1, the lan-
guage of association, expresses only “pure” probabilistic
facts and relationships; L2, the language of probabilis-
tic intervention, allows expressing probabilities of basic
conditional “if. . . then. . . ” statements; L3, the language
of probabilistic counterfactuals, encodes probabilities
for arbitrary boolean combinations of such conditional
statements. Using standard ideas from logic and exist-
ing results, we can address questions about definability
and expressiveness. For instance, it is easy to prove in
our framework that each language is strictly more ex-
pressive than those below it in the hierarchy (Prop. 1, 2
below). We can also interpret well-known insights from
the graphical models and causal learning literatures as
graph definability results for appropriate probabilistic
logical languages, analogously to correspondence the-
ory in modal logic (van Benthem 2001).
In possession of a precise syntax and semantics for
probabilistic causal reasoning, questions of axiomatiza-
tion naturally arise. That is, we would like to identify a
perspicuous set of basic principles that underly all such
reasoning. One of our main technical contributions is
a series of finitary (sound and complete) axiomatiza-
tions for each level of the causal hierarchy (Thm. 5),
relying on methods from semialgebraic geometry. As a
corollary to these completeness results, we also reveal a
“small-model property” with the consequence that sat-
isfiability and validity for L1, L2, and L3 can be decided
in polynomial space (Thm. 13).
Finally, in the last part of the paper we consider an al-
ternative interpretation for our three logical languages.
Probabilistic programs, with an appropriate notion of
causal intervention, provide a procedural semantics for
probabilistic counterfactual claims and queries. We es-
tablish an equivalence between these models and a nat-
ural subclass of computable structural causal models
(Thm. 14). The equivalence in turn implies soundness
and completeness of our axiomatizations with respect
to this interpretation as well.
Relation to Previous Work
While deterministic causal counterfactuals and proba-
bilistic logics have both received extensive treatment
independently, the present contribution appears to be
the first systematic study of probabilistic counterfac-
tuals. Our work thus synthesizes and improves upon
a long line of previous work. Axioms for causal condi-
tionals interpreted over structural causal models are
well understood (Galles and Pearl 1998; Halpern 2000;
Pearl 2009; Zhang 2013; Ibeling and Icard 2019)
and play a distinct role in causal reasoning tasks
such as identification (Shpitser and Pearl 2008;
Pearl and Bareinboim 2012). Indeed, some promi-
nent approaches to causal learning and identifi-
cation even employ algorithmic logic-based tech-
niques (Hyttinen, Eberhardt, and Ja¨rvisalo 2014;
Hyttinen, Eberhardt, and Ja¨rvisalo 2015;
Triantafillou and Tsamardinos 2015).
Meanwhile, much is known about formalized proba-
bility calculi. (Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990) con-
sidered a probability logic built over a language of
polynomials sufficiently expressive to encompass es-
sentially all ordinary probabilistic reasoning about
propositional facts, including Bayesian inference, con-
ditional independence, and so on. However they
left open the problem of explicit axiomatization. A
(strongly) complete axiomatization was later provided
by (Perovic´ et al. 2008) using an infinitary proof rule.
Whereas our main interest is causal reasoning be-
yond the first level of the hierarchy, Thm. 5 inci-
dentally establishes the first (weakly) complete fini-
tary axiomatization for “pure” probability logic over
a language of polynomials. Moving to the second and
third levels of the hierarchy, Thm. 5 also presents
the first combined axiomatization for probabilistic rea-
soning about causal counterfactuals. At the second
level, we draw upon an existing characterization by
(Tian, Kang, and Pearl 2006).
(Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990) established a
complexity upper-bound (PSPACE) for their satisfiabil-
ity problem. On all three levels of the hierarchy, we
obtain the same upper bound for our decision prob-
lem (Thm. 13). Both arguments rely crucially on the
procedure given by (Canny 1988) to decide the existen-
tial theory of a real closed field. It has been previously
suggested to apply cylindrical algebraic decomposition
(which decides the full first-order theory of real closed
fields) to causal questions (Geiger and Meek 1999).
Encoding causal knowledge in an implicit way via a
generative probabilistic program has been explored re-
cently by a number of research groups (Lake et al. 2017;
Bingham et al. 2019; Tavares et al. 2019). Determinis-
tic conditionals over “simulation programs” have been
axiomatized (Ibeling and Icard 2018), showing that in
general such an interpretation validates strictly fewer
principles than structural causal models. This weaker
axiomatic system was also embedded in a proba-
bility logic with linear inequalities (Ibeling 2018). It
is possible, however, to restrict the class of prob-
abilistic programs so as to ensure equivalence with
(an appropriate class of) structural causal models
(Ibeling and Icard 2019). We draw on all of this work
in what follows.
Structural Models
We are interested in structural causal models (see, e.g.,
(Pearl 2009)) defined over a signature consisting of a
fixed set V of endogenous variables. Each model is also
defined over a set U of exogenous variables. Every R ∈
V ∪U takes on a value from an admissible set Val(R).
While V and U may be infinite, we assume Val(V ) is
finite for all V ∈ V. Given a set of variables S ⊆ V∪U,
we call an assignment s ∈ Val(S) of each variable S ∈ S
to a value s(S) ∈ Val(S) an instantiation of S.
Def. 1 (Structural Causal Model). We define a SCM
to be a pair M = (F , P ), where P is a probability
measure on a σ-algebra Σ of instantiations u of U, and
F = {fV }V ∈V is a set of functions fV : Val(V ∪U)→
Val(V ), one for each endogenous variable.
Thus every fV is a function from endogenous instan-
tiations v and exogenous instantiations u to a value
fV (v,u) ∈ Val(V ). P (U) and F thus define the obvi-
ous joint probability distribution PM(V).
Def. 2 (Intervention). An intervention is a partial func-
tion i : V 7→ Val(V ). It specifies variables dom(i) ⊆ V
to be held fixed, and the values to which they are fixed.
Intervention i induces a mapping of SCMs, also de-
noted i, so that i(M) is identical to M, but with fV
replaced by the constant function fV (·) = i(V ) for each
V ∈ dom(i). We say i is finite whenever dom(i) is finite.
Using this definition we introduce a relation  of
direct causal influence (cf. (Halpern and Pearl 2005)).
We say X  M Y if there are endogenous instanti-
ations v1,v2 ∈ Val(V) such that v1(V ) 6= v2(V ) iff
V = X and some non-negligible set u ⊆ Val(U) such
that fY (v1,u) = fY (v1,u
′) 6= fY (v2,u) = fY (v2,u
′)
for any u,u′ ∈ u. This in turn induces a directed graph
GM = (V, M). Throughout we restrict attention to
SCMs M such that  M is well-founded, generaliz-
ing the common acyclicity (or semi-Markov) condition.
This is also equivalent to the requirement for infinite
SCMs from (Ibeling and Icard 2019).
We say M is Markov if each variable is PM-
independent of its non-descendants (in GM) conditional
on its parents. The Markov condition is guaranteed
provided the exogenous variables are jointly indepen-
dent and every endogenous variable depends only on
one exogenous variable (Pearl 2009, Thm. 1.4.1). We
define d-separation on a dag G standardly, and write(
(X ⊥⊥ Y)|Z
)
G
to say that the variables X are d-
separated from Y given Z. In Markov structures d-
separation guarantees conditional independence.
In order to establish a correspondence (Thm. 14)
with probabilistic programs, we introduce a further re-
striction on SCMs, following previous work on com-
putable causal models (Janzing and Scho¨lkopf 2010;
Ibeling and Icard 2019). Def. 3 below assumes a very
simple “coin-flip” probability space; we leave it as an
exercise to show that there is no loss of generality
compared to using any computable probability space
as in, e.g., (Ackerman, Freer, and Roy 2019), including
any standard continuous probability distributions.
Def. 3. M = (F , P ) is computable if (1) its exogenous
variables consist of infinitely many binary U1, U2, . . . ,
i.i.d. and uniform under P , and (2) the collection F =
{fV }V is uniformly computable (Weihrauch 2000).
Call a model M = (F , P ) measurable if under every
finite intervention i, the joint distribution Pi(M)(V) is
well-defined. The next Fact is straightforward.
Fact 1. Every computable SCM is measurable.
Proof. Let v ∈ Val(V) and let u =
⋂
V ∈V uV where
uV =
{
u : fV (v,u) = v(V )
}
. Letting Σ be our σ-
algebra, Pi(M)(v) is well-defined if u ∈ Σ. It suffices
to show that uV ∈ Σ for all V since Σ closes under
countable intersection. There is a machine that halts
outputting the value fV (v,u) for any u ∈ uV . By then
it has seen only finitely many exogenous bits, whose
values we write in a finite vector ~u(u). Thus the cylinder
set u′
(
~u(u)
)
of u′ that agree with ~u(u) wherever the
latter is defined is contained in uV . So letting u
′
V =⋃
u∈uV
u′
(
~u(u)
)
, we have u′V ⊆ uV . Every cylinder is
in Σ and there are only countably many cylinders, so
u′V ∈ Σ; obviously uV ⊆ u
′
V so uV ∈ Σ as desired.
LetM be the class of all measurable SCMs that have
a well-founded causal influence graph.1 Further, letM∗
be the subclass of computable models in M.
Probabilistic Conditionals
Syntax
We define a succession of language fragments as follows,
where V ∈ V and v ∈ Val(V ):
Lint ::= ⊤ | V = v | Lint ∧ Lint
Lprop ::= V = v | ¬Lprop | Lprop ∧ Lprop
Lcond ::= [Lint]Lprop
Lfull ::= Lcond | ¬Lfull | Lfull ∧ Lfull
Based on these fragments we define a sequence of
three increasingly expressive probabilistic languages
{Li}i=1,2,3. Each language Li speaks about probabil-
ities over a base language Lbasei . The base languages are
Lbase1 = Lprop, L
base
2 = Lcond, L
base
3 = Lfull.
Our languages describe facts about the probabilities
that base language formulas hold. As our formulas are
finitary, such facts correspond to polynomials in these
probabilities. Let us make this precise. Fixing a termi-
nal set T , define the polynomial terms in the variables
1Any two models in M have the same endogenous sig-
nature V. But they do not necessarily share the same set of
exogenous variables U; SCMs are thus non-parametric.
T to be those t generated by this grammar (where T
generates any element of T ):
t ::= T | t+ t | t · t | − t.
Then the terms of Li are polynomials over probabilities
of base formulas, i.e., polynomial terms in the variables{
P(ǫ) : ǫ ∈ Lbasei
}
. The language Li, i = 1, 2, 3, is then
a propositional language of term inequalities:
Li ::= t > t | ¬Li | Li ∧ Li
where t is a term of Li. We employ the following ab-
breviations. For Lprop and Lfull we take ⊥ to stand for
any propositional contradiction, and ⊤ for any proposi-
tional tautology. For terms: 0 for P(⊥), 1 for P(⊤). For
Li formulas, we write t1 ≡ t2 for (t1 > t2) ∧ (t2 > t1),
and t1 > t2 for (t1 > t2) ∧ ¬(t2 > t1). Note that we
may use any rational number as a term via representing
its numerator as a sum of 1s and clearing its denomi-
nator through an inequality t > t, and we write q for a
rational q thus considered as a term.
Strictly speaking, P(β) for β ∈ Lprop is not a well-
formed term in L2 or L3. We nonetheless use this no-
tation with the understanding that P(β) is a shorthand
for P([⊤]β). L2 and L3 thus extend L1 in this sense.
L1, L2, and L3 correspond to the three lev-
els of the causal hierarchy as proposed by
(Shpitser and Pearl 2008; Pearl 2009); see also
(Bareinboim et al. 2020). L1 is simply the lan-
guage of probability, capturing statements like
P(Y = y|X = x) > 1/2, which is shorthand for(
P(⊤) + P(⊤)
)
· P(X = x ∧ Y = y) > P(X = x). L2
encompasses assertions about so-called causal effects,
e.g., statements like P([X = x]Y = y) > q.
Semantics
A model is simply a measurable SCM M = (F , P ).
Since M is well-founded, each u determines the values
of all endogenous variables. Thus, for β ∈ Lprop we will
write F ,u |= β, defined in the obvious way. For α ∈ Lint
we define the intervention operation iα so that iα(F) is
the result of applying the interventions specified by α to
F (Def. 2). Then F ,u |= [α]β just in case iα(F),u |= β.
We have thus defined F ,u |= ǫ for all ǫ ∈ Lfull.
Next, for anyM = (F , P ) define the set SM(ǫ) = {u :
F ,u |= ǫ}. Measurability of M guarantees that SM(ǫ)
is always measurable. Toward specifying the semantics
of Li we define
q
t
y
M
recursively, with the crucial clause
given by
q
P(ǫ)
y
M
= P
(
SM(ǫ)
)
. Satisfaction of ϕ ∈ Li is
as expected:M |= t1 > t2 iff
q
t1
y
M
≥
q
t2
y
M
,M |= ¬ϕ
iff M 6|= ϕ, and M |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M |= ϕ and M |= ψ.
As in previous work, it is easy to see that none of the
languages L1,L2,L3 is compact (Perovic´ et al. 2008;
Ibeling and Icard 2018; Ibeling and Icard 2019). Con-
sequently Thm. 5 claims weak completeness only.
Comparing Expressivity
With a precise semantic interpretation of our three lan-
guages in hand, we can now show rigorously that they
form a strict hierarchy, in the sense that models may
be distinguishable only by moving up to higher levels
of the hierarchy.
Prop. 1. L2 is strictly more expressive than L1.
Proof. Consider M1 with U ∼ Bernoulli(0.5) and X :=
U while Y := X ; in M2 we have Y := U and X := Y .
It is easy to see by an induction on terms in L1 thatq
t
y
M1
=
q
t
y
M2
, and thus M1 and M2 validate the
same L1 formulas. Yet, M1 |= P([X = 1]Y = 1) ≡
1, while M2 6|= P([X = 1]Y = 1) ≡ 1. In particular
the schema P(β|α) ≡ P([α]β) is also falsified by M2,
a reflection of the distinction between observation and
intervention.
Prop. 2. L3 is strictly more expressive than L2.
Proof. Consider an example adapted from
(Avin, Shpitser, and Pearl 2005) with two endoge-
nous and two exogenous variables X,UX , Y, UY ,
where UX ∼ Bernoulli(0.5) and X = UX , while
UY ∼ Unif(0, 1, 2). The difference between models M1
and M2 is the function for binary variable Y . In M1 we
have Y equal to (X ↔ UY = 0), and in M2 we have Y
given by (X → UY = 0)∧(UY = 2→ X). It is then easy
to check (by induction) that M1 and M2 validate all
the same L2 formulas, whereas, e.g.,
q
p
y
M1
6=
q
p
y
M2
,
with p the term denoting the probability of necessity
and sufficiency P([X = 0]Y = 0 ∧ [X = 1]Y = 1).
Note also that
q
P([⊤]Y = 1 ∧ [X = 1]Y = 1)
y
M1
6=
q
P([⊤]Y = 1 ∧ [X = 1]Y = 1)
y
M2
in this second exam-
ple, showing that even allowing simple conjunctions of
the form γ ∧ [α]β would increase the expressive power
of L2. It is thus not possible in general to reason in
L2 about conditional expressions such as P([α]β|γ).
On the other hand L2 does handle conditional ef-
fects, since, e.g., P([α]β|[α]γ) > t can be rewritten as
P
(
[α](β ∧ γ)
)
> t · P([α]γ).2
In a companion article we improve upon Props. 1 and
2 by showing that for i < j the Li-theory of a model
almost-never (i.e., with measure zero) determines its
Lj-theory (Bareinboim et al. 2020, Thm. 1).
Graph Definability and Do-Calculus
Given the languages and interpretation considered so
far, we mention as an aside that it may be enlighten-
ing to consider a notion of graph validity, analogous
to “frame validity” in modal logic (van Benthem 2001).
Let us say G |= ϕ just in case M |= ϕ for all Markov
structures M such that G = GM.
For any dag G there is a probability distribution P
whose conditional independencies are exactly those im-
plied by d-separation in G (Geiger and Pearl 1990). It
2In the notation of do-calculus (Pearl 1995;
Pearl 2009), the expression P([α]β|[α]γ) would be written
as P(β | do(α), γ).
is then easy to construct an SCM M with G = GM and
P = PM, which immediately gives:
3
Prop. 3. G |= P(X∧Y|Z) ≡ P(X|Z)P(Y|Z) if and only
if
(
(X ⊥⊥ Y)|Z
)
G
. In other words, the graph property
of d-separation is definable in L1.
One of the most intriguing components of struc-
tural causal reasoning is the do-calculus (Pearl 1995;
Pearl 2009; Zhang 2008), allowing the derivation of
causal effects from observational data. This calculus can
also be seen as involving graph validity. The next propo-
sition is a slight extension of what was already proved
in (Pearl 1995); see also (Bareinboim et al. 2020).
Prop. 4. Let G be a dag over variables V.4 Then
1. G |= P
(
[X]Y|[X](Z ∧ W)
)
≡ P([X]Y|[X]W) iff(
(Y ⊥⊥ Z)|X,W
)
G
X
;
2. G |= P([X ∧ Z]Y|[X ∧ Z]W) ≡ P
(
[X]Y|[X](Z ∧W)
)
iff
(
(Y ⊥⊥ Z)|X,W
)
G
XZ
;
3. G |= P([X ∧ Z]Y|[X ∧ Z]W) ≡ P([X]Y|[X]W) iff(
(Y ⊥⊥ Z)|X,W
)
G
X,Z(W)
.
All formulas here are in L2.
We leave further exploration of questions about graph
definability in these languages for a future occasion.
Axiomatizations
We now give systems AXi each of which axiomatizes
the validities of Li over both M and M
∗. Note that
since L1 ⊂ L2 ⊂ L3, the full system AX3 completely
axiomatizes all three languages. Its axioms lie in L3,
however, while our AX2 and AX1 include only principles
expressible in the respective lower-level languages.
These probabilistic logics build on the base (deter-
ministic) logics, as any equivalent base formulas must
be assigned the same probability. We call ǫ ∈ Lfull =
Lbase3 an Lfull validity, and write |= ǫ, if for all F and u
we have F ,u |= ǫ. Equivalently, |= ǫ if F |= ǫ for all F
that are deterministic, i.e., lack exogenous dependence.
The Lfull validities for Boolean ranges have been
axiomatized in (Ibeling and Icard 2019), and the cor-
responding satisfiability problem is NP-complete. We
need to add one more axiom schema,5 for every V ∈ V;
here the dummy variables v, v′ range over Val(V ):
Def.
∧
v 6=v′
¬[α] (V = v ∧ V = v′) ∧
∨
v
[α](V = v).
3P(X ∧Y|Z) ≡ P(X|Z)P(Y|Z) represents a conjunction
over all instances of this schema with all combinations of
values X = x, Y = y, Z = z. Here X,Y,Z are lists of
variables and x,y, z are corresponding instantiations.
4G
XZ
is G minus any edges into X or out of Z, and Z(W)
is the set of all Z-nodes that are not ancestors of any W-
node in G
X
.
5In (Ibeling and Icard 2019), Def merely amounts to the
law of excluded middle since Val(X) = {0, 1} for all X ∈ V;
here we assume only that every Val(X) is finite.
AX3
The inference rule and first 4 axioms capture proposi-
tional and probabilistic reasoning.
MP. Inference rule: ϕ,ϕ→ ψ ⊢ ψ
Bool. Boolean tautologies over L3
NonNeg. P(ǫ) > 0
Add. P(ǫ ∧ ζ) + P(ǫ ∧ ¬ζ) ≡ P(ǫ)
Dist. P(ǫ) ≡ P(ζ) whenever |= ǫ↔ ζ.
A single schema, ProbRec, captures the interaction
between the probability and conditional modalities. In
ProbRec instances, X1 6= Xn and x1 6= x
′
1, . . . , xn 6= x
′
n.
Abbreviating, e.g., Xi = xi as xi:
ProbRec.
n−1∧
i=1
P
(
[αi ∧ xi]x
∗
i+1 ∧ [αi ∧ x
′
i]¬x
∗
i+1
)
6≡ 0
→ P
(
[αn ∧ xn]x
∗
1 ∧ [αn ∧ x
′
n]¬x
∗
1
)
≡ 0.
Finally, the following 16 axioms, collectively called
Poly, constitute a polynomial calculus:
OrdTot. t1 > t2 ∨ t2 > t1
OrdTrans. t1 > t2 ∧ t2 > t3 → t1 > t3
NonDegen. ¬ (0 ≡ 1)
AddComm. t1 + t2 ≡ t2 + t1
AddAssoc. (t1 + t2) + t3 ≡ t1 + (t2 + t3)
Zero. t+ 0 ≡ t
AddOrd. t1 > t2 → t1 + t3 > t2 + t3
MulOrdG. t1 > t2 ∧ t3 > 0→ t1 · t3 > t2 · t3
MulOrdL. t1 > t2 ∧ t3 6 0→ t1 · t3 6 t2 · t3
MulComm. t1 · t2 ≡ t2 · t1
MulAssoc. (t1 · t2) · t3 ≡ t1 · (t2 · t3)
One. t · 1 ≡ t
MulDist. t1 · (t2 + t3) ≡ t1 · t2 + t1 · t3
ZeroMul. t · 0 ≡ 0
NoZeroDiv. t1 · t2 ≡ 0→ t1 ≡ 0 ∨ t2 ≡ 0
Neg. t+ (−t) ≡ 0.
AX2
As for AX2, note that Add and ProbRec do not belong
to L2 since L
base
2 does not close under conjunction. To
obtain AX2, form the axiomatization as above, but re-
place Add and ProbRec with the variants below. There
is one instance of ProbRec2 for every finite W ⊂ V.
Y < Z means that Y < Z for every Y ∈ Y, Z ∈ Z.
Add2. P
(
[α](β ∧ γ)
)
+ P
(
[α](β ∧ ¬γ)
)
≡ P
(
[α]β
)
ProbRec2.
∨
< order
on W
∧
X,Y,Z⊆W
X∩Y=∅
Y<Z
x,y,z
P
(
[x]y
)
≡ P
(
[x ∧ z]y
)
.
In exceptional cases, a probability at the third causal
level reduces to the second level. We need the following
X Z Y
W
Figure 1: A graph over which (2)-(6) are all valid.
principle to capture their nonnegativity:
IncExc.
∧
Y⊆W
∑
X⊆W\Y
(−1)|X|P
([
W \ (X ∪Y)
]
W
)
> 0.
AX1
Conditionals in L1 are trivial, so ProbRec becomes ir-
relevant. Consequently AX1 consists simply of the 5
schemata MP, Bool, NonNeg, Add, Dist with metavari-
ables confined to Lbase1 = Lprop, along with Poly.
Sample Derivation
Before proving completeness (Thm. 5) we illustrate the
power of AX3 through a representative derivation. Our
goal is to derive the example in (Pearl 1995, §3.2):
P
(
[x∗]y∗
)
≡
∑
z
P(z|x∗)
∑
x
P(y∗|x ∧ z)P(x) (1)
This formula (in L2) is not in general valid. But it does
follow from further assumptions easily statable in L2.
Formulas (2)–(4) below are instances of the second do-
calculus schema, while (5) and (6) are instances of the
third schema.
P
(
[X ]Z
)
≡ P(Z|X) (2)
P
(
[X ]Y |[X ]Z
)
≡ P
(
[X ∧ Z]Y
)
(3)
P
(
[Z]Y |[Z]X
)
≡ P(Y |X ∧ Z) (4)
P
(
[X ∧ Z]Y
)
≡ P
(
[Z]Y
)
(5)
P
(
[Z]X
)
≡ P(X) (6)
Prop. 4 provides the graphical assumptions needed
to justify each of these assertions. For example, they
are all valid over the graph in Fig. 1 (Pearl 1995;
Pearl 2009). We now argue that
(
(2) ∧ (3) ∧ (4) ∧ (5) ∧
(6)
)
→ (1) is derivable in our calculus.6 For sim-
plicity we derive this from AX3 in L3. First, by ap-
peal to MP, Bool, and Dist, we have that P([x∗]y∗) ≡
P
(∨
z([x
∗]y∗∧ [x∗]z)
)
, which in turn using Add is equal
to
∑
z P([x
∗]y∗ ∧ [x∗]z). By Poly this can be shown
equal to
∑
z P([x
∗]z)P([x∗]y∗|[x∗]z). By (2) and (3)
this is equal to
∑
z P(z|x
∗)P([x∗ ∧ z]y∗), and by (5)
6It is worth observing that this derivation would go
through even if we considered the weaker logic for Lfull
studied in (Ibeling and Icard 2018). That is, deriving
(
(2)∧
(3) ∧ (4) ∧ (5) ∧ (6)
)
→ (1) does not depend on any of
the causal axioms that characterize structural causal mod-
els (Halpern 2000; Pearl 2009). However, slightly weaker
assumptions—e.g., P([X]Z) ≡ P([X]Z|X) in place of (2)—
would require the additional axioms.
to
∑
z P(z|x
∗)P([z]y∗). Employing a similar argument
to that above (using MP, Bool, Add, and Dist), this is
equal to
∑
z P(z|x
∗)
∑
x P([z]y
∗|[z]x)P([z]x). By (4) and
(6) we finally obtain
∑
z P(z|x
∗)
∑
x P(y
∗|x ∧ z)P(x).
Completeness Theorems
Thm. 5. Each AXi is sound and complete for the va-
lidities of Li with respect to both M
∗ and M.
Proof. We first prove the result for AX3. An analogous
argument shows AX1-completeness. Then we do AX2.
AX3, AX1 Soundness is straightforward. Complete-
ness: show any consistent ϕ ∈ L3 is satisfiable. We
work toward a normal form (Lem. 7). Let Vϕ ⊂ V
be the finite set of variables appearing in ϕ, let Lfull(ϕ)
be the fragment of Lfull in which only variables from
Vϕ appear, and let Lint(ϕ) = Lint ∩ Lfull(ϕ); the latter
language is finite. Let ∆ =
{∧
α∈Lint(ϕ)
[α]vαϕ : v
α
ϕ ∈
Val(Vϕ) for each α
}
.7 Distinct elements of ∆ are
jointly Lfull-unsatisfiable by Def. Let ∆sat = {δ ∈ ∆: 6|=
δ → ⊥}. A preliminary result (where ⊢3 is AX3 proof):
Lem. 6. Let ǫ ∈ Lfull(ϕ). Then ⊢3 P(ǫ) ≡
∑
δ∈∆
δ|=ǫ
P(δ).
Proof. We show that |= ǫ ↔
∨
δ|=ǫ δ. Since |= ¬[α]β ↔
[α]¬β and |= [α](β ∧ γ)↔ [α]β ∧ [α]γ, we have |= ǫ↔
[α1]β1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]βn with distinct αi’s; since we can
conjoin any [α]⊤, we can suppose every α ∈ Lint(ϕ)
appears. By Def, |= [α]β ↔ [α]
∨
vϕ|=β
vϕ
8 so
|= ǫ↔
∧
i
[αi]
∨
vϕ|=βi
vϕ ↔
∨
v1ϕ|=β1
...
vnϕ|=βn
∧
i
[αi]v
i
ϕ. (7)
(7) disjoins elements of ∆, and any δ /∈ ∆sat may
be freely appended as a disjunct. For any δ appearing
in (7), clearly δ |= ǫ. Conversely, suppose δ |= ǫ but
δ =
∧
i[αi]v
i
ϕ does not appear in (7). Then δ ∈ ∆sat
and viϕ 6|= βi for some i. Thus there are F such that
F |= [αi]v
i
ϕ but F 6|= [αi]βi, so F 6|= ǫ, a contradiction.
Finally, sum over mutually exclusive events.
There is a consistent clause in the disjunctive nor-
mal form of ϕ so we may assume that ϕ ∈ L3 is a
conjunction of literals (using MP, Bool) and apply the
following:
Lem. 7. Let ϕ be a conj. of lit. There are polynomial
terms {ti, t
′
i′}i,i′ in the variables
{
P(δ)
}
δ∈∆
such that
⊢3 ϕ↔
∨
∆′⊆∆
[ ∧
δ∈∆′
P(δ) > 0 ∧
∧
δ/∈∆′
P(δ) ≡ 0
∧
∑
δ∈∆
P (δ) ≡ 1 ∧
∧
i
ti > 0 ∧
∧
i′
t′i′ > 0
]
. (8)
7Or, ∆ =
{∧
α
[α]f(α) : f ∈ Lint(ϕ) → Val(Vϕ)
}
.
8vϕ |= β, for vϕ ∈ Val(Vϕ), means |= [⊤](vϕ → β).
Proof. The disjunction in (8) and the first three con-
juncts within each disjunct follow easily by proposi-
tional reasoning,Dist (including Def), NonNeg, and Add.
To obtain the last two conjuncts, since ϕ is a conjunc-
tion of L3 literals suppose ϕ =
∧
i fi > 0∧
∧
i′ ¬(f
′
i′ > 0).
By OrdTot, AddOrd, OrdTrans, AddComm, Neg, Zero,
ϕ↔
∧
i fi > 0∧
∧
i′(−f
′
i′ > 0). We claim each fi,−f
′
i′ has
an equivalent polynomial in the variables
{
P(δ)
}
δ∈∆
.
This gives the {ti, t
′
i′}i,i′ . It can be easily shown by
induction on polynomial terms that Poly allows re-
placement of equivalents.9 Replacing equivalents under
Lem. 6 finishes the proof.
Some disjunct of (8), say that where ∆′ = ∆∗, is
consistent so we suppose ϕ is such disjunct. This is also
a polynomial system S over unknowns
{
P(δ)
}
δ∈∆
. We
now show it has a solution. Our primary tool is the
following semialgebraic result (Stengle 1974).
Thm. 8 (Positivstellensatz). Let R = Q[x1, . . . , xn]
and F,G,H be finite sets of polynomials in R. Let
cone(G) ⊆ R be the closure of G ∪ {s2 : s ∈ R} un-
der + and ×, and let ideal(H) =
{∑
h∈H ahh : ah ∈
R for each h
}
. Then either
{
f 6= 0, g ≥ 0, h = 0 :
(f, g, h) ∈ (F,G,H)
}
has a solution over Rn, or there
exist g ∈ cone(G), h ∈ ideal(H), n ∈ N such that
g + h+ f2n = 0 (9)
where f =
∏
f ′∈F f
′.
Each clause in S easily translates to a polynomial in
Thm. 8; a clause t′i > 0 becomes two constraints: t
′
i ≥ 0
and t′i 6= 0. If there’s no solution, let t = (g + h) +
f2n for some g,h, f as in (9), where f2n is an iterated
multiplication. We claim ϕ ⊢ t ≡ 0 ∧ t > 0 so that ϕ
is inconsistent, a contradiction. We use the principles
below, all derivable from Poly:
AddPos. t1 > 0 ∧ t2 > 0→ t1 + t2 > 0
MulPos. t1 > 0 ∧ t2 > 0→ t1 · t2 > 0
NegAdd. −(t1 + t2) ≡ (−t1) + (−t2)
NegMul. −(t1 · t2) ≡ (−t1) · t2
NegNeg. −(−t) ≡ t
OrdSq. t · t > 0.
First, we show ϕ ⊢ t > 0. Note that ϕ ⊢ g > 0 by OrdSq
and ϕ ⊢ h ≡ 0 by ZeroMul given Thm. 8 and S. Also,
ϕ ⊢ f > 0 by NonDegen if m′ = 0 in S or n = 0 in (9)
and by MulPos otherwise. So ϕ ⊢ (g + h) + f2n > 0
by AddPos. Now we show ϕ ⊢ t ≡ 0. In fact, we
don’t need ϕ. We show that Poly is powerful enough
to simplify polynomials; then by soundness and since
(9) holds identically, ⊢ t ≡ 0. Using MulDist, NegAdd,
⊢ t ≡m where m is a sum of non-0 monomials, each of
which is either 1 itself or contains no factors of 1 (One),
9That is, that if ⊢ t1 ≡ t2 then provably t1 can be re-
placed with t2 in any composite term in which it appears.
Both MulOrd directions are crucial to the proof.
and contains at most one − sign (NegMul, NegNeg).
By MulComm,MulAssoc group the factors in each left-
associatively and in increasing (lexicographic) order of
their variables. Then with AddComm, AddAssoc, Neg
group and cancel out to 0 equal but opposite monomi-
als. Adding all the 0s, we have ⊢m ≡ 0.
Thus S has solution s. We move toward constructing
a model satisfying (8). Define X δY if |= δ → [α ∧
x]y ∧ [α ∧ x′]¬y for some α, x 6= x′, y.
Lem. 9. Let P : ∆ → [0, 1] be computable and
suppose
∑
δ P(δ) = 1, that supp(P) ⊂ ∆sat,
10 and⋃
δ∈supp(P) δ is acyclic. Then there is M ∈ M
∗ such
that
q
P(δ)
y
M
= P(δ) for every δ ∈ ∆.
Proof. For each δ ∈ supp(P) ⊂ ∆sat, there are struc-
tural mechanisms F(δ) =
{
f δV
}
V
such that  F(δ) ⊂
V2ϕ
11 and F(δ) |= δ (Ibeling and Icard 2019, Thm. 2).
Consider M = (F , P ) with one exogenous variable
U = {U} where Val(U) = supp(P) and P (U =
δ) = s(δ). Define F = {fV }V by fV (v, δ) = f
δ
V (v).
F , δ1 |= δ2 iff δ1 = δ2 since elements of ∆ are jointly
Lfull-unsatisfiable. Thus
q
P(δ)
y
M
= s(δ) for all δ ∈ ∆.
Clearly M can be made to satisfy Def. 3, since P is
computable.
We check that  M is well-founded. We claim that
 M=
⋃
δ∈supp(P) F(δ) =
⋃
δ∈supp(P) δ so that  M
is a dag on the finitely many vertices Vϕ. The first
equality is trivial. To obtain the second, in the ⊆ di-
rection, if X F(δ)Y then X,Y ∈ Vϕ, and there are
v1,v2 differing only at X such that y1 6= y2 where
y1 = f
δ
Y (v1) and y2 = f
δ
Y (v2). Let Z = Vϕ \ {X,Y },
let z = v1(Z) = v2(Z), and let x1 = v1(X) 6=
x2 = v2(X). Since Y 6 F(δ)Y and V 6 F(δ)Y for any
V /∈ Vϕ, F(δ) |= [z ∧ x1]y1 ∧ [z ∧ x2]y2. Let δ =
[z ∧ x1]v
z∧x1
ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ [z ∧ x2]v
z∧x2
ϕ . If v
z∧x1
ϕ (Y ) 6= y1 or
vz∧x2ϕ (Y ) 6= y2 then since F(δ) |= δ, we have F(δ) |= ⊥,
a contradiction. Thus |= δ → [z ∧ x1]y1 ∧ [z ∧ x2]¬y1
and X δY . The ⊇ direction is trivial.
Note s : ∆ → [0, 1] can be assumed computable, as
S has an algebraic (Tarski 1949) and a fortiori com-
putable solution. Since supp(s) = ∆∗, by Dist and
ProbRec, applying Lem. 9 with P = s gives M |= ϕ.
AX2 Soundness: only IncExc is nontrivial. We leave it
to the reader to generalize the following AX3 derivation
of a prototypical instance. By NonNeg, we have P
(
[y ∧
z]¬x∧[x∧z]¬y∧[x∧y]z
)
> 0. Marginalizing with Add2,
we obtain P
(
[x∧y]z
)
−P
(
[x∧y]z∧([y∧z]x∨[x∧z]y)
)
> 0.
By Dist and P(ǫ ∨ ζ) ≡ P(ǫ) + P(ζ) − P(ǫ ∧ ζ) we have
that P
(
[x ∧ y]z
)
− P
(
[x ∧ y]z ∧ [y ∧ z]x
)
− P
(
[x ∧ y]z ∧
[x ∧ z]y
)
+ P
(
[x ∧ y]z ∧ [y ∧ z]x ∧ [x ∧ z]y
)
> 0. Now
Distribute “reversibility” |= [α](β ∧ γ) ↔ [α ∧ β]γ ∧
10supp(P) = {δ :P(δ) > 0} is the support of P.
11The definition of influence implies that for a determinis-
tic model F = {fV }V , X  F Y if there are v1,v2 ∈ Val(V)
such that v1(V ) 6= v2(V ) iff V = X and fY (v1) 6= fY (v2).
[α ∧ γ]β (Galles and Pearl 1998; Halpern 2000) across
the last three terms. Obtain at last P
(
[x∧y]z
)
−P
(
[y](x∧
z)
)
− P
(
[x](y ∧ z)
)
+ P(x ∧ y ∧ z) > 0, the conjunct in
IncExc corresponding to w = x ∧ y ∧ z, Z = {Z}.
Completeness: we obtain analogues of Lem. 6, 7. Let
IncExcϕ be the instance of IncExc for W = Vϕ. Where
< is an order on Vϕ, let ProbRec2ϕ(<) be the L2∧
X,Y,Z⊆Vϕ
X∩Y=∅
Y<Z
x,y,z
∑
vϕ|=y
P
(
[x]vϕ
)
≡
∑
vϕ|=y
P
(
[x ∧ z]vϕ
)
.
Define ∆2 =
{
[α]vϕ : α ∈ Lint(ϕ),vϕ ∈ Val(Vϕ)
}
and
let Lcond(ϕ) = Lcond ∩ Lfull(ϕ). Below, ⊢2 will denote
AX2 provability.
Lem. 10. Let [α]β ∈ Lcond(ϕ). Then ⊢2 P
(
[α]β
)
≡∑
vϕ|=β
P
(
[α]vϕ
)
.
Proof. Like that of Lem. 6, but using Add2 and Def.
Lem. 11. Let ϕ be a conj. of lit. There are polynomial
terms {ti, t
′
i′}i,i′ in the variables
{
P(δ)
}
δ∈∆2
such that
⊢2 ϕ↔
∨
<
[ ∧
δ∈∆2
P(δ) > 0 ∧
∧
α
∑
vϕ
P
(
[α]vϕ
)
≡ 1
∧
∧
α
∑
vϕ|=α
P
(
[α]vϕ
)
≡ 1 ∧ ProbRec2ϕ(<)
∧ IncExcϕ ∧
∧
i
ti > 0 ∧
∧
i′
t′i′ > 0
]
. (10)
Proof. Like that of Lem. 7, but using Lem. 10. Note
that ⊢2 P
(
[α]α
)
≡ 1 since |= [α]α.
We can apply Lem. 11 since we can again take ϕ to
be a conjunction of L2 literals. Let <
∗ be one whose dis-
junct in (10) is consistent. This disjunct is a polynomial
system S. Being consistent with Poly, S has a solution
s, which constitutes a P∗ set for Vϕ in the parlance
of (Tian, Kang, and Pearl 2006), where an exact char-
acterization of such sets is obtained. S entails all crite-
ria12 of this characterization, so there existsM inducing
s (Tian, Kang, and Pearl 2006, Thm. 2). Since s can
again be taken computable we can take M ∈M∗.
Complexity
Let Prob-Causal-Sati be the problem of deciding if
a given formula ϕ ∈ Li, encoded standardly, is satis-
fiable. The completeness proof above delivers no ob-
vious complexity bound, but we will now obtain a
polynomial space bound by extending an argument
of (Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990). As PSPACE
closes under complement, this shows validity is also
PSPACE. The crux is a small-model property:
12Namely, “effectiveness, recursiveness, directionality, and
inclusion-exclusion inequalities.” Directionality holds for the
order <∗.
Lem. 12. Any satisfiable ϕ has a small model M in
the sense that
∣∣{δ ∈ ∆ : qP(δ)y
M
> 0
}∣∣ ≤ |ϕ| where ∆
is defined as in Lem. 7.
Proof. Let E be the Lfull formulas appearing in ϕ;
we have |E| < |ϕ|. Let M′ |= ϕ and let ∆(M′) ={
δ ∈ ∆sat : δ ⊆  M′
}
. Consider the system S ={∑
δ P(δ) = 1
}
∪
{∑
δ|=ǫ P(δ) =
q
P(ǫ)
y
M′
}
ǫ∈E
in
the unknowns
{
P(δ)
}
δ∈∆(M′)
. By a fact of linear al-
gebra (Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990, Lem. 2.5),
since S has |E| + 1 equations, it has a nonnegative so-
lution s where at most |E| + 1 variables are nonzero.
Apply Lem. 9 to s, giving a small M. By Lem. 6,q
P(ǫ)
y
M
=
q
P(ǫ)
y
M′
for all ǫ ∈ E, so M |= ϕ.
Thm. 13. Each Prob-Causal-Sati ∈ PSPACE.
Proof. Algorithm: for each subset ∆′ ⊆ ∆sat of size
|∆′| ≤ |ϕ| such that
⋃
δ′∈∆′  δ′ is acyclic, form a for-
mula ϕ(∆′) in the existential theory of the reals (∃R),
over variables {P(δ′)}δ′∈∆′ as follows. Conjoin the equa-
tions
∑
δ′ P(δ
′) = 1 and
∧
δ′ P(δ
′) ≥ 0 to the result of
replacing any P(ǫ) appearing in ϕ with
∑
δ′|=ǫ P(δ
′).
Then check satisfiability of ϕ(∆′) via a PSPACE de-
cision procedure for ∃R (Canny 1988). Declare ϕ sat.
iff any ϕ(∆′) is sat. Why does it work? If ϕ is satisfi-
able, we have a model with a small ∆′ by Lem. 12, and
the corresponding {P(δ′)}δ′ witness ϕ(∆
′). Conversely,
if ϕ(∆′) is satisfiable in ∃R for some ∆′, then apply
Lem. 9 to get a model satisfying ϕ.
Probabilistic Programs
Thm. 5 establishes soundness and completeness for both
the class of measurable SCMs, and also for the more re-
stricted class of computable SCMs. The latter result is
especially useful for establishing a link to an alternative
perspective on causal modeling, emphasizing a procedu-
ral rather than declarative aspect (Icard 2017). We take
a probabilistic program to be any generative algorithm:
Def. 4 (Probabilistic simulation model). A probabilis-
tic simulation is a probabilistic Turing machine with a
read-only random bit tape, a work tape, and a write-
only variable tape encoding endogenous variables V.
A probabilistic simulation outputs values for endoge-
nous variables, eventually establishing a complete en-
dogenous instantiation v on the variable tape. Thus,
like a SCM, a probabilistic simulation model T gives
a probability distribution PT(V). The following defini-
tion of intervention endows these models with a genuine
causal interpretation:
Def. 5. Given a computable intervention i (as in Def.
2) and a corresponding oracle for i, the simulation i(T)
emulates T but acts as if the square for any X ∈ i is
fixed to the value i(X); it dovetails this emulation with
a procedure that writes i(X) to X for all X ∈ dom(i).
In (Ibeling and Icard 2019) a subclass T ∗ of simula-
tion programs is studied, namely those (1) that sat-
isfy a strong “functionality” property for interventions,
(2) that produce a solution under every intervention,
and (3) for which the direct causal influence relation is
well-founded (analogously to the requirement above for
SCMs). We can then obtain:
Thm. 14. For every M ∈ M∗ there is a T ∈ T ∗
such that, for every computable intervention i, we have
Pi(M)(V) = Pi(T)(V), and vice versa.
Proof. The only difference between the present set-
ting and the one in (Ibeling and Icard 2019) is the
presence of an infinite sequence of random bits (re-
call Def. 3 for SCMs). Thus, the same construction as
in (Ibeling and Icard 2019, Thm. 1) gives a model for
which, when a random bit string is fixed, we have equiv-
alence under any interventions of the endogenous vari-
ables.
With the obvious interpretation of Li formulas over
simulation models in T ∗, we thus have:
Cor. 15. Each AXi is sound and complete for the va-
lidities of Li with respect to T
∗.
Conclusion
We have introduced a series of increasingly expressive
languages encoding levels of the “ladder of causation”
(Shpitser and Pearl 2008; Pearl 2009), interpreted over
both standard structural causal models and probabilis-
tic simulation programs. We moreover established some
fundamental theoretical results about these languages,
including finitary axiomatizations and PSPACE com-
plexity upper bounds for satisfiability and validity. This
marks the first systematic study of a probabilistic logic
of causal counterfactuals.
Along the way we also noted how logical languages
might help to illuminate aspects of probabilistic causal
reasoning. As a final illustration, let us return again to
the do-calculus. We noted two seminal formula schemas
from L2 that feature centrally in the do-calculus:
P
(
[X ∧ Z]Y|[X ∧ Z]W
)
≡ P
(
[X]Y|[X](Z ∧W)
)
(11)
P
(
[X ∧ Z]Y|[X ∧ Z]W
)
≡ P
(
[X]Y|[X]W
)
(12)
Where Γ is a set of L3 formulas, let Γdo be all in-
stances of (11) and (12) that can be inferred from
Γ using the rules and axioms of AX3 (equiv. are en-
tailed by Γ). As usual, we say Γ |= ϕ to mean
that Γ semantically entails ϕ, while Γ ⊢ ϕ means
there is a proof in AX3 of ϕ from assumptions in Γ.
The completeness results of (Huang and Valtorta 2006;
Shpitser and Pearl 2008), together with Thm. 5, estab-
lish the following combined completeness result:
Cor. 16. Let p be a term of L1 and ǫ ∈ L
base
2 = Lcond.
Then Γ |= P(ǫ) ≡ p implies Γdo ⊢ P(ǫ) ≡ p.
In other words, to know whether a causal effect P(ǫ)
can be reduced to a pure probabilistic expression p,
given some set of assumptions Γ, it suffices to take
as premises only instances of (11) and (12) (which by
Prop. 4 can all be inferred from specific graphical prop-
erties), and apply the calculus AX3 (or simply AX2).
The derivation of (1) from (2)–(6) above is a concrete
illustration of this Corollary.
More generally, we submit that the formalization of
causal languages offered in this paper helps to clarify
what exactly the levels of the causal hierarchy come to,
and how we might gain a better understanding of how
they relate to each other and to tasks that an intel-
ligent agent might need to solve. For a start on such
exploration, see (Bareinboim et al. 2020).
Future Work
Our work opens up a number of possibilities for further
investigation. We mention several here.
Although the complexity of decision problems for
the languages considered here is relatively low com-
pared to many expressive logical systems, it may be
desirable to consider yet smaller fragments of prob-
ability logic. For example, the language of probabil-
ity statements with linear inequalities remains in NP
(Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990). While this frag-
ment is too impoverished to express general assertions
about conditional probability, one could extend the lan-
guage only minimally; cf. (Ivanovska and Giese 2010).
It is also natural to consider more expressive
languages. For instance, (Ibeling and Icard 2019)
included a (deterministic) causal influence relation
 explicitly in the logical language, showing, e.g.,
that transitivity of this relation characterizes exactly
the “local” SCMs (Pearl 2009). Would this charac-
terization extend to the probabilistic interpretation
of causal influence? Indeed, from the perspective of
causal learning and reasoning it would be natural
to include explicit statements about the underlying
graph in the logical syntax (Geiger and Pearl 1990;
Hyttinen, Eberhardt, and Ja¨rvisalo 2014;
Hyttinen, Eberhardt, and Ja¨rvisalo 2015;
Triantafillou and Tsamardinos 2015).
On the other hand, leaving graph properties merely
implicit as we have done here raises numerous theoret-
ical questions about graph definability, as briefly ex-
plored above. Analogous to the case of modal logic,
we can ask for the class of graphical properties that
can be defined by L1, L2, or L3. Considering dif-
ferent types of causal graphs may lead to variations
of this question, e.g., with mixed ancestral graphs
(Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000) which we know
reveal a different version of Prop. 4 (Zhang 2008).
Finally, while Props. 1 and 2 report known results
establishing basic strictness of the hierarchy, it would
of course be desirable to develop a much more compre-
hensive and systematic theory of expressiveness for the
three languages, again akin to what we have for many
other logical languages. What kinds of invariance prop-
erties do these languages imply? We leave these open
questions for future work.
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